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Introduction
Sources o f Solicitor-Client Privilege
Definition o f Privilege
Besides their frequent appearances in Internet jokes, doctors, lawyers and priests 
share a duty to guard the secrets of those who come to them seeking help. This 
professional duty may conflict with their legal duty to produce evidence relevant to 
a matter before the court.1 The law, however, recognises the priority of certain 
professional relationships and the importance of confidentiality in maintaining them. 
While both doctors2 and priests3 enjoy a limited right to withhold information 
communicated to them in confidence, the courts recognise a prima facie privilege,
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1 A. M. v. Ryan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157 [hereinafter Ryan] at para 19. As a general rule (subject to the 
exceptions discussed in this paper) any competent witness is compellable to appear before the court to 
give evidence. R. v. Barnes (1921), 61 D.L.R. 623 (Ont. C.A.).
2 There is a statutoiy privilege in Quebec civil law accorded to the doctor-patient relationship: The 
Medical Act, R. S. Q. 1977 c.M-9, s. 42. In Ontario, O. Reg. 856/93 under the Medicine Act, S. 0 . 1991, 
s.l para. 10 prohibits a doctor from giving up patient-information except on consent or as required by 
law.
3 English and Canadian courts have not compelled members of the clergy to disclose confidential 
information obtained in the course of religious duties. R. v. Gruenke, [ 1991 ] 3 S.C.R. 263. There is no 
reported case in either Canada or England in which a priest has been forced to disclose secrets of the 
confessional. J. Sopinka et al., The Law o f Evidence in Canada 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1999) 
[hereinafter Sopinka] at 784. Newfoundland and Quebec are the only Canadian provinces with statutory 
privilege enacted to protect the clergy-parishioner relationship in civil lawsuits. Newfoundland: 
Evidence Act, R. S. N. 1990, c. E-16, s.8. Quebec: Charter o f Human Rights and Freedoms, R. S. Q. 
1997, c. C-12, s.9.
only4 for confidential communications with lawyers.5 Solicitor-client privilege 
belongs to the client6 and is a substantive right7 to prevent disclosure of confidential 
communications concerning legal advice or assistance.
Origins o f Privilege
The common law has protected communications between client and solicitor as far 
back as the sixteenth century.8 At that time, members of the legal profession 
qualified as gentlemen9 and could invoke the “obligations of honour among 
gentlemen”10 to ensure the lawyer was “duty-bound to guard closely the secrets of 
his client.”11
4 The courts have occasionally protected other relationships, recognising privilege on a case-by-case 
basis. This flexible approach was bolstered in the 70s by the Supreme Court of Canada decision in 
Slavutych v. Baker, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 254 [hereinafter Slavutych v. Baker] where a “a tenure form sheet” 
given to a university authority in confidence was privileged. The decision was based on the principle 
of breach of law, originating in the law of equity, and the evidentiary principles related to privilege (see 
Origins o f Privilege concerning the distinction between these two grounds). In obiter dicta, the court 
adopted Wigmore’s four criteria for determining applicability of privilege [see discussion of Wigmore’s 
conditions at The Advent o f Principled Analysis]. The approach based on Wigmore’s criteria has been 
used in evaluating communications between priest and parishioner. (R. v. Church of Scientology (1987),
31 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (Ont. C.A.)). In/?, v. Gruenke, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 263, testimony of a pastor that the 
accused had planned a murder was heard and proved instrumental in securing a conviction for first 
degree murder.
5 Sopinka, supra note 3 at 714.
* The lawyer has no right to unilaterally waive privilege on behalf of the client. Canadian Bar 
Association, Ontario Branch, Report o f the Special Committee o f the Canadian Bar Association -  
Ontario Regarding Solicitor-Client Privilege (Toronto: The Association, 1985), Appendix A at 1.
7 The right to confidentiality is no longer only a rule of evidence, but a substantive rule. When it was 
a rule of evidence alone, it did not prevent parties, other than the solicitor or his agent, from disclosing 
confidential solicitor-client communications. Descoteaux v. Mierzwinski, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860 
[hereinafter Descoteaux v. Mierzwinski] per Lamer J. As a substantive right, confidentiality of 
communications between solicitor and client may be raised in any circumstances where such 
communications are likely to be disclosed without the client’s consent; there is a presumption in favour 
of confidentiality; and any legislation interfering with this right should be enacted in a way that 
minimises interference.
8 Solosky v. R. (1979), 50 S.C.C. (2d) 495 [hereinafter Solosky] at 506. Privilege makes an appearance 
in Berdv. Lovelace (1577), 21 E.R. 33 and Dennis v. Codrington (1580), 21 E.R. 53.
9 J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 3rd ed. (London: Butterworths, 1990) at 46.
10 R. J. Delisle, Evidence: Principles & Problems 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) [hereinafter Delisle] 
at 663.
11 Solosky, supra note 8 at 506.
By the 18th century, a lawyer’s honour no longer formed the basis of privilege - 
not because doubts about lawyers’ honour arose - but because the courts deemed this 
privilege too obstructive to the search for truth.12 Instead, they introduced a new 
rationale, pertinent only to the attorney:13
The foundation of [the privilege] rule ... is ... regard to interests of justice, which 
cannot be upholden, and to the administration of justice, which cannot go on, 
without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the Courts, and in 
those matters affecting rights and obligations which form the subject of all judicial 
proceedings.14
Thus privilege, divorced from the lawyers' honour, now belongs to the client and 
protects him from disclosure of communications that fall within the ambit of 
solicitor-client privilege.15 Only the client, and not the solicitor, can waive 
privilege.16
It must be noted that there is another type of privilege originating in equity17 and 
distinct from solicitor-client privilege relating to the law of evidence.18 The 
equitable doctrine of confidential communications is based on the notion that “a 
person who has obtained information in confidence is not allowed to use it as a 
springboard for activities detrimental to the person who made the confidential 
communication.”19 In other words, using a person’s confidences against him is 
unfair. A party cannot claim solicitor-client privilege through reliance on the 
equitable doctrine; the party asserting privilege must establish, on a balance of 
probabilities, existence of the necessary evidentiary criteria to claim solicitor-client 
privilege.20
12 Delisle, supra note 10 at 663.
13 Ibid.
M This oft-quoted statement of policy was articulated in Greenough v. Gaskell (1833), 39 E.R. 618 at 
620.
15 Delisle, supra note 10 at 664.
16 This proposition is discussed in more depth in Waiver o f Privilege, p. 205.
17 Ibid.
18 Sopinka, supra note 3 at 717. See Slavutych v. Baker, supra note 4, where privilege was found on 
both grounds.
19 Seager v. Copydex [1967] 2 All E.R. 415 at 417 per Lord Denning, adopting the statement of 
Roxburgh J. in Terrapin Ltd. v. Builders'Supply Co. (Hayes) Ltd. et al., [1960] R.P.C. 128.
20 McCarthy Tetrault v. Ontario (1993), 95 D. L. R. (4th) 94 (Ont. Prov. Div.).
Rationale for Solicitor-Client Privilege
The rules of solicitor-client privilege were originally restricted to an exemption from 
testimonial compulsion,21 ensuring that the court could not compel the lawyer to 
divulge a clients confidential communications. Gradually, privilege extended to 
communications made during litigation or in contemplation of litigation, and finally, 
it expanded to cover any consultation for legal advice, whether litigious or not.22 In 
fact, the legal profession recognized the importance of protecting the relationship 
between the accused and his lawyer23 long before the practice of retaining counsel 
became uniform.24
Members of the legal community generally acknowledge that, without 
guaranteed secrecy, an effective relationship between the lawyer and his client 
would be impossible, and without this relationship the adversarial system would lie 
a-shambles:
If  the privilege did not exist at all, every one would be thrown upon his own legal 
resources. Deprived o f all professional assistance, a man would not venture to 
consult any skilful person, or would only dare to tell his counsellor half his case.25
For some, protecting the relationship between the client and his advocate was 
paramount to the search for truth:
The ... m ischief o f  prying into a m an’s confidential consultations with his legal 
advisor, the general evil o f  infusing reserve and dissimulation, uneasiness and 
suspicion and fear into those communications which must take place, and which, 
unless in a condition o f  perfect security, must take place uselessly or worse, are too 
great a price to pay for truth itself.26
21 Solosky, supra note 8 at 506.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 By 6 & 7 Will. IV, c. 114, all prisoners accused of felony were permitted to make full defence by 
counsel. In 1758, however, there was the embarrassing trial of Lord Ferrers, William Barnard’s Case, 
19 S.T. 815, where the prisoner was obliged to cross-examine witnesses without the aid of counsel, in 
order to prove the defence of insanity. A. T. Carter, A History o f English Legal Institutions (London: 
Butterworth & Co., 1906) at 58.
25 Greenough v. Gaskell, supra note 14 at 620.
26 Pearce v. Pearce (1847), 16 L.J. Ch. 153 at 159.
Solicitor-client privilege is the oldest privilege known to common law.27 It 
protects “the integrity of the relationship most vital to the continuing operation of 
the legal system.”28 In Canada, privilege is constitutionally protected for the 
purposes of criminal law:
In the criminal context the principles embodied in the rules o f  privilege have gained 
constitutional protection by virtue o f the enshrinement o f  the right to full answer and 
defence, the right to counsel, the right against self-incrimination and the 
presumption o f  innocence in ss. 7 , 10(b), 11(c) and 11(d) o f  the Canadian Charter 
o f  Rights and Freedoms.29
Although privilege is entrenched in the common law, it is neither “lightly created 
[nor] expansively construed,”30 because it is an “exception to the demand for eveiy 
man’s evidence”31 and thereby derogates from the search for truth.
The Advent o f Principled Analysis
Under the traditional law, privilege afforded to solicitor-client communications was 
subject to specific exceptions. Privilege only attached when the lawyer was acting 
in his professional capacity32 and when the client intended a communication to be 
confidential.33 Privilege did not apply for communications made to facilitate the 
commission of a crime or fraud.34 This treatment of solicitor-client privilege 
evolved gradually on a case-by-case basis and did not result from a single principled 
approach.
In 1975, the Supreme Court of Canada expressly adopted35 Dean Wigmore’s 
four-part analysis for determining whether privilege should attach to a 
communication:
27 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 at 389 (C.A. 6th Cir., 1981).
28 R. D. Manes&M.P. Silver, Solicitor Client Privilege in Canadian Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1993) 
[hereinafter Manes & Silver] at 1.
29 Smith v. Jones, [ 1999] 1 S.C.R. 455 at para 7 per Major J.
30 Ibid.
31 United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090 at 3108 (1974).
32 Solosky, supra note 8 at 508.
33 O shea v. Woods, [1891] P. 286 at 289, cited in Solosky, supra note 8 at 507.
34 R. v. Cox andRailton ( 1884), 14Q.B.D. 153.
35 Slavutych v. Baker, supra note 4 at 228.
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be 
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory 
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be 
sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the 
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct 
disposal of litigation.
Although Wigmore’s test was applied in Slavutych v. Baker to decide whether 
communications between people other than a lawyer and his client were privileged, 
we can apply the same reasoning to solicitor-client communications. It has long 
been established that solicitor-client communications for obtaining legal advice meet 
the four criteria.36 There are circumstances, however, when communications 
between a client and his lawyer are not protected. These circumstances can be 
memorized as enumerated exceptions, or derived from a single set of principles 
represented by the Wigmore criteria. The courts have noted these circumstances as 
exceptions to the rule of solicitor-client privilege, and their exclusion flows from the 
application of Wigmore’s test. The advantage of using the principled approach is 
the relative ease of deriving all exceptions from a single set of rules, instead of 
referring to a compendium of exceptions:37
36 Manes & Silver, supra note 28 at 21. Sopinka, supra note 3 at 728.
37 In R v. Starr, [2000] S.C.J. No. 40 (S.C.C.) online: QL (S.C.C.), Iacobucci J. preferred the principled 
approach to the traditional “pigeon-hole” exception approach in the context of the hearsay rule. In para. 
201, he states that “In addition to improving trial fairness, bringing the hearsay exceptions into line with 
the principled approach will also improve the intellectual coherence of the law of hearsay.” In her 
dissent, McLachlin C. J. confirmed that while the common law exceptions to the hearsay rule remain the 
law, they are “interpreted and updated to conform” to the principled approach manifest in “the twin 
requirements of necessity and reliability.” [para 3] The law of solicitor-client privilege can be 
approached in the same way by aligning the existing exceptions with Wigmore’s principled approach. 
L'Heureux-Dube, dissenting in Starr, says that the principled approach to hearsay was adopted to 
supplement, rather than replace the existing common law exceptions [para 22]. This assertion runs 
contrary to the reasoning of McLachlin J. (as she then was) writing for the court in R. v. Khan, [1990]
2 S.C.R. 531. McLachlin J. summarised four tests for the admission of hearsay as “necessity and 
reliability.” The four tests came from the dissenting decision of Lord Pearce in Myers v. Director o f 
Public Prosecutions, [1965] A.C. 1001, in which he characterised the tests as “the principle which 
underlines all exceptions.” An identifiable principle underlying exceptions cannot be construed as a 
mere supplement to the exceptions. As an aside, I would add that treating a general principle as an
The Wigmore criteria ... provide a general framework within which policy 
considerations and the requirements of fact-finding can be weighed and balanced on 
the basis of their relative importance in the particular case before the court.38
Solicitor-Client Privilege in the Trial o f Ken Murray 
Background Facts
The scope of solicitor-client privilege has recently received considerable attention 
in connection with the trial of Ken Murray, Paul Bernardo’s former lawyer. Paul 
Bernardo and Karla Homolka made six videotapes that Bernardo secretly conveyed 
to Murray after Bernardo was charged with the murders of Leslie Mahaffy and 
Kristen French. Two of the videotapes show dreadful acts perpetrated by Bernardo 
and Homolka on the young women. The tapes also show the sexual assaults of both 
Jane Doe and Tammy Homolka. Two other videotapes portray Homolka in sexual 
scenes, and while pornographic, do not depict any illegal acts.
After Bernardo was arrested, he retained Ken Murray as his lawyer and gave 
him a map and letter stating that Murray could find something in Bernardo’s former 
residence that he would need for the defence.39 Following instructions, Murray 
discovered the videotapes hidden in a bathroom pot light. Murray copied and kept 
the tapes to use them to prove that Homolka was a willing participant in the assaults, 
rather than a compliant abused spouse. Apparently, Murray planned to use the tapes 
either to discredit Homolka or to negotiate a resolution of charges by threatening to 
discredit the Crown’s principal witness.40 Since the tapes do not show the actual 
murders, it is possible that, on seeing Homolka’s enthusiasm in the videotapes, the 
jury could reasonably doubt that Bernardo (rather than Homolka) was the
additional exception, defeats the purpose of deriving a general principle. Notably, the criteria of 
necessity and reliability, set out in Khan, can be applied to evaluate statements of persons not available 
to give evidence; the approach is not limited to statements made by children even though Khan dealt 
with statements of a child witness. R. v. Smith, [ 1992] 2 S.C.R. 915. Lamer C.J. noted in Smith that the 
decision in R. v. Khan “should be understood as the triumph of a principled analysis over a set of 
ossified judicially created categories.”
38 Manes & Silver, supra note 28 Sopinka, supra note 3 at 21.
19R. v. Murray (2000), 186 D.L.R. (4th) 125 at para 7 [hereinafter/?, v. Murray].
40 Ibid at para 35.
murderer.41
When Murray found himself unable to represent Bernardo, he turned the case 
(but not the tapes) over to Mr. Rosen, retained counsel for himself, and contacted the 
Law Society of Upper Canada seeking advice.42 The Law Society advised Murray 
to deliver the materials in his possession to the presiding judge; Murray informed 
Bernardo of the Law Society’s instructions, and Bernardo informed Rosen of the 
tapes and their contents. Once Rosen gained possession of the tapes, viewed them 
and decided the best course of action, he turned the tapes over to police.
The Privilege Arguments
In the wake of Bernardo’s trial, Ken Murray was charged under subsection 139(2) 
of the Criminal Code43 with obstruction of justice:44
Everyone who wilfully attempts in any manner other than a manner described in 
subsection (I)45 to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice is guilty of an 
indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.
Legal justification for concealment of the videotapes, such as solicitor-client 
privilege, would have provided Murray a complete defence to the charge of 
obstruction of justice.46 Murray, however, did not claim that the confidentiality of 
the tapes was protected “under the umbrella of solicitor-client privilege.”47 Instead, 
he was acquitted because the Crown did not establish the necessary mens rea, failing 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Murray’s intention was “wilfully” to
41C. Blatchford, “Ken Murray’s Not-So-Excellent Adventure” (2000) 24:10 Canadian Lawyer 28 at 28.
42 R. v. Murray, supra note 39 at para. 69.
43 R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46.
44 R. v. Murray, supra note 39.
45 s. 139( 1 ) provides, “Every one who wilfully attempts in any manner to obstruct, pervert or defeat the 
course of justice in a judicial proceeding,
(a) by indemnifying or agreeing to indemnify a surety, in any way and either in whole or in part, or
(b) where he is a surety, by accepting or agreeing to accept a fee or any form of indemnity whether in 
whole or in part from or in respect of a person who is released or is to be released from custody,
is guilty of
(c) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or
(d) an offence punishable on summaiy conviction."
46 R. v. Murray, supra note 39 at para 112.
47 Ibid.
obstruct the course of justice. Interestingly, Bernardo intervened to request that any 
communications made to Murray during their relationship be protected from 
disclosure by solicitor-client privilege.48
The Scope and Limitations of Solicitor-Client Privilege
Overview
Whether or not litigation is pending, privilege will attach (in the absence of waiver) 
to all direct confidential communications between a solicitor and client (including 
agents/ employees) made to obtain legal advice not intended to facilitate the 
commission of a crime or fraud.49 If any of these conditions are not satisfied, 
privilege will either not attach or be limited in scope depending on which condition 
is not met. Each condition can be treated either as an evidentiary exception to the 
rule that confidential communications between a lawyer and client are privileged, 
or can be evaluated in light of Wigmore’s criteria.
Common Law Qualifications o f Solicitor-Client Privilege
Direct Communications
To attract unconditional privilege, a communication must pass directly between 
solicitor and client (an agent may represent each).50 When a lawyer or client 
communicates with third parties other than agents or employees, privilege does not 
attach, unless the communications are made for the dominant51 purpose of 
reasonably contemplated litigation.52 At stake is the preservation of the adversarial 
system in which counsel control fact-presentation unburdened by an obligation to 
disclose material acquired in preparation for trial:53
48 R. v. Murray [Evidence-Solicitor-Client Privilege], [2000] OJ. No. 685 [hereinafter R. v. Murray 
[Evidence-Solicitor-ClientPrivilege]]. The issues raised in Bernardo’s applications are limited in scope 
and do not offer as good an opportunity to determine the ambit of solicitor-client privilege as whether 
or not solicitor-client privilege should have protected the Bernardo tapes.
49 Solosky, supra note 8 at 506.
50 Manes & Silver, supra note 28. Sopinka, supra note 3 at 9.
51 Waugh v. British Railways Board, [1979] 2 All E.R. 1169.
52 Wheeler v. Le Marchant (1887), 17 Ch. D. 675 at 682; Flack v. Pacific Press Ltd. (1970), 14 D.L.R. 
(3d) 334 at 336 (B.C.C.A.).
53 Sopinka, supra note 3 at 745.
The adversarial system is based on the assumption that if each side presents its case 
in the strongest light the court will be best able to determine the truth. Counsel must 
be free to make the fullest investigation and research without risking disclosure of 
his opinions, strategies and conclusions to opposing counsel.54
It is possible to argue that when Bernardo turned the tapes over to his solicitor, 
he intended to show Homolka’s culpability. The tapes could, presumably, convey 
the message that Homolka was not cowing and unwilling but keen and capable of 
murder.55 In R. v. Murray, Gravely J. pointed out that the tapes are not similar “for 
example, to a sketch, which might be prepared by a client to illustrate a point to his 
counsel, or even a videotape prepared for that purpose. ... Murray’s discussions 
with his client about the tapes are covered by the privilege; the physical objects, the 
tapes, are not.”56 But why not? Leaving aside for the moment the characterisation 
of the tapes as physical evidence, one can suppose that the information on the tapes 
formed a direct communication between Bernardo and Murray made to discredit 
Homolka:
A series of physical acts on being observed serve to communicate to the observer the 
fact that the actor is capable of their performance. ... In this sense, the acts or 
gestures are “communications.”57
Confidentiality o f Communications
Unless communication is made with the expectation of confidentiality, privilege is 
not applicable. The mere fact that a communication took place between solicitor and 
client is not enough to attract privilege;58 confidentiality must be established and the 
solicitor must be acting in his professional capacity.59 An intention that a
54 Ottawa-Carleton (Regional Municipality) v. Consumers' Gas Co. (1990), 74 O.R. (2d) 637 at 643.
35 The description of one of Homolka’s taped “performances” in R. v. Murray, supra note 39 at para 25 
certainly gives that impression.
56 Ibid at para 115.
57 Paquet v. Jackman (1980), 24 B.C.L.R. 287 (S.C.).
58 Homelyn v. Whyte (1874), 6 P.R. 143 (Ch.); Hoffman v. Crear (1897), 17 P.R. 404 (C.A.) held in 
Ontario that communications between solicitor and client were confidential by nature, but these were 
overturned by subsequent cases.
59 Zielinski v. Gordon (1982), 40 B.C.L.R. 165 (S.C.); R. v. Bencardino (1973), 2 O.R. (2d) 351.
communication should remain secret can be inferred from the circumstances.60
To find the tapes, Murray used a map given to him by Bernardo in a sealed 
envelope; to inform Bernardo that the operation was successful, he used an agreed- 
on “code.”61 Not surprisingly, the tapes were conveyed in secret and with every 
expectation of confidentiality.
Recipient o f Communications
To attract privilege, communications must be made to a lawyer acting in his 
professional capacity.62 It is no longer required that the lawyer be competent to 
practice in the jurisdiction relevant to the issue in question; if one party to the 
communication is a lawyer63 then the communication is privileged.64 The lawyer 
must, however, be a qualified legal adviser, or at a minimum, the client must 
reasonably believe the lawyer to hold such qualification.65 Equal protection is 
provided for communications with a lawyer’s agents or employees, such as articling 
students, law clerks or secretaries, made to facilitate the obtainment of legal advice.66 
If unnecessary third parties are present when the communication takes place, the 
privilege is vitiated.67 Yet, the client need not worry about merely being overheard 
by third parties; if they intended the communication to be confidential and took
60 Sopinka, supra note 3 at 730. Privilege may be vitiated by the presence of unnecessary third parties 
when communication takes place, and certain subject matter, such as the identification or address of the 
client is generally not covered by privilege.
61 Murray was to ask Bernardo during their scheduled telephone conversation “How about those Jays” 
if he found the tapes, and “How about those Leafs” if he did not. R. v. Murray, supra note 39 at paras 
8, 12.
62 Ontario (Securities Commission) v. Greymac Credit Corp. (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 328, [hereinafter 
Greymac] wherein communications with a solicitor in his capacity as president of the company were 
not privileged.
63 Assuming there exist no other bars to privilege.
64 Mutual Life Assurance Co. o f Canada v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General) (1989), 28 C.P.C. (2d)
101 at 104. It was held in U.S. v. Mammoth Oil Co., [1925] 2 D.L.R. 966 (Ont. C.A.) that no privilege 
attached when an American citizen consulted a Canadian lawyer on American law since a Canadian 
lawyer is not qualified to practice in the U.S. This decision proved too restrictive (consider, for example, 
difficulties this approach would cause multi-national corporations).
45 Jt v. Choney (1908), 17 Man. R. 467,13 C.C.C. 289 (C.A.).
66 Descoteaux v. Mierzwinski, supra note 7.
67 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton Rev., 1961) at 601-603.
reasonable steps to ensure this, then it will be privileged.68
Material to which Privilege Can Attach and the Meaning of
“Communication ”
Communications Versus Physical Objects
Photographs, films and tapes have all received protection from disclosure in past 
cases. In General Accident Assurance Company et al. v. Chursz et al.,69 a videotape 
prepared by a third party for the plaintiffs’ lawyer was treated in the same way as the 
written documents.70 Film secretly made by the defendant of the plaintiff, who 
claimed that injuries sustained in a car accident had immobilized him, were held to 
be privileged.71 The court treated the videotapes as written documents and applied 
the same test to decide whether privilege attached.72 In R. v. Nikolovski,n the 
Supreme Court of Canada spoke to the admissibility of videotape evidence, 
emphasising that “tapes could provide cogent and convincing evidence of culpability 
or equally powerful and convincing evidence of innocence.”74 For the purposes of 
solicitor-client privilege, it appears that the communicative value of videotape is 
often equated with that of documents, and in instances where documents qualify for 
privilege, so do videotapes.
In R. v. Murray, Gravely J. distinguished between “Murray’s discussions with 
his client,” which were privileged and “the physical objects, the tapes,”75 which were 
not. There exists no precedent for this contrast and it is questionable whether 
privilege should be distinguished based on the communication media. If a written 
document or conversation is privileged, so too should be a videotape containing the
68 Manes & Silver, supra note 28. Sopinka, supra note 3 at 81.
69 [1999] O.J. No. 3291 (Ont. C.A.).
70 The videotape and other documents were not privileged because they were not created, by the third 
party, in contemplation of litigation. The same approach was employed in McIntyre v. Canadian Pacific 
Ltd. (1984), 43 C.P.C. 59 (Ont. H.C.J.) where photographs of an accident site were treated, for the 
purposes of determining privilege, as any other document.
71 Paquet v. Jackman (1980), 24 B.C.L.R. 287 (S.C.).
72 Ibid.
73 [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197.
74 R. v. Nikolovski, ibid at para 15.
75 R v. Murray, supra note 39 at para 115.
same information.
"Facts or Acts ” Exclusion
It remains to consider whether the tapes were “facts” or “acts” since both are 
excluded from solicitor-client privilege. When a communication is limited to a 
disclosure of fact that exists independently, such as information readily available to 
the solicitor about funds passing through a client’s trust account, it is not 
privileged.76 In other words, “a party cannot conceal a fact merely by revealing it 
to his lawyer.”77 The United States Supreme Court attempted to clarify the 
distinction between legal advice and fact in Upjohn Co. v. United States:78
The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, “what did you say or write 
to the attorney?”, but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his 
knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement o f  such fact into his 
communication to his attorney.79
A solicitor must disclose the client’s actions performed in his presence.80 In Re 
Ontario Securities Commission and Greymac Credit Corp,ix the court characterised 
a transfer of money from the client to solicitor as an act and refused to allow a claim 
of privilege. In Madge v. City o f Thunder Bay,*2 where the issue was whether or not 
the defendant had delivered minutes of a meeting to her solicitor, the court ruled that 
Greymac was confined to its facts, and that the defendant was protected by solicitor- 
client privilege and did not have to reveal visits her lawyer’s office. Madge was 
followed in R. v. Nusca83 where the court did not allow disclosure of whether the 
lawyer sent a letter to the accused, because disclosure in this instance “would result 
in a communication between solicitor and client being used to the detriment of the 
accused in his defence of the charge and a denial of his constitutional protection
76 Greymac, supra note 62.
77 Upjohn Co. v. United States, (1981), 449 U.S. 393 (C.A. 6th Cir. 1980).
78 Ibid.
19 Ibid a i m .
80 Manes & Silver, supra note 28. Sopinka,, supra note 3 at 133.
81 Greymac, supra note 62.
82 (1990), 72 O.R. (2d) 41 (H.C.J.).
83 [1999] O.J. No. 1691.
under the Charter of Rights.”84
Conveyance of the video tapes was an “act”, but one analogous to the 
conveyance in Madge orR. v. Nuscal Given the criminal law context of Bernardo’s 
case (normally associated with a higher evidentiary threshold), it is unlikely that 
privilege would have been lifted. Similarly, characterisation of the content as 
“factual” is insufficient to remove privilege. An accused testimony, shielded by the 
right not to testify85 and the right to remain silent,86 should not be garnered from 
confidential communications with a lawyer. The question remains whether the tapes 
constitute a solicitor-client communication. If so, their classification as statements 
of fact is unlikely to vitiate privilege.
Characterisation o f the Tapes
The Bernardo tapes are problematic because they can be treated both as 
communications in preparation for litigation and as physical evidence of his terrible 
crimes. Lawyers have a duty to turn over evidence relevant to a criminal offence.87 
This duty transcends both the evidentiary rules of solicitor-client privilege88 and the 
duty of confidentiality owed to the client.89 It is, however, limited in Canada to “the 
apparent instrumentalities of crime -  such as weapons -  and the apparent products 
of crime -  such as stolen money or property.”90
The tapes depicting the monstrous acts perpetrated on Bernardo’s captives, while
84 R v. Nuska, supra note 83 at para 14. Note that in the criminal context, solicitor-client privilege is 
protected by the rights in ss.7,10(b), 11(c) and 11(d) of the Charter. Smith v. Jones, supra note 29.
85 ss.l 1(c) of the Charter, Sopinka, supra note 3 at 821.
86 s.7 of the Charter, Ibid at 822.
87 Derek Lundy ed., Barristers & Solicitors in Practice (Toronto: Butterworths, 1998) [hereinafter 
Lundy] at para 5.113.
88 State ex. rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wash. (2d) 828 (1964), cited in R. v. Murray, supra note 39 at para 
118.
89 Lundy, supra note 87 at 5.39 -  5.40.
90 Clarkson v. Eckardt ( 1924), 26 O. W.N. 105. Paciocco and Stuesser in their book The Law o f Evidence 
2nd ed. (1999), Chapter 7: Privilege; on-line QL: db PASE [hereinafter Paciocco & Stuesser], appear 
to endorse a broader exclusion to privilege than mere “instrumentalities or products of crime,” stating 
that privilege does not apply to “physical objects.” However, the only examples of exclusion Paciocco 
and Stuesser provide are “smoking gun” and “stolen property.” Since a “smoking gun” is an “instrument 
of crime,” and “stolen property” is a “product of crime” Paciocco and Stuesser have not, in fact, 
broadened the exclusion.
not instruments of crime, are undoubtedly the products of criminal activity. 
Privilege does not protect criminal communications. No English or Canadian court 
has been required to decide whether solicitor-client privilege attaches to evidence 
that is both a product of crime, and a confidential communication made in 
preparation for litigation. It is reasonable therefore, at least for the present purposes, 
to characterise the tapes as “communications.”
Legal Advice
Wigmore explains the modem rule91 concerning the purpose of communications that 
merit solicitor client privilege as follows:
Where legal advice o f  any kind is sought from a professional legal adviser in his 
capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose, made in confidence 
by the client, are at his instance protected from disclosures by him self or by the legal 
adviser, except the protection be waived.
Privilege attaches to all communications made within the ambit of the solicitor-client 
relationship, starting from the time when the client first approaches the lawyer. It 
may be invoked in circumstances where confidential communications are likely to 
be revealed without the client’s consent.92 Privilege is, consequently, very broad. 
However, -  and here was Bernardo’s problem -  privilege only attaches to 
communications made for legal advice.93 It is generally agreed that,
Documents existing before litigation was conceived and not brought into existence 
for the purpose o f obtaining legal advice are not free from duty to produce... merely 
because they are in the possession o f a solicitor for the purposes o f  an action. There 
must be a real expectation o f  litigation before there is a privilege from production.94
The tapes were not created with a view to obtaining legal advice; the apparent 
purpose was prurient and voyeuristic; and Bernardo never attempted to claim 
otherwise. In fact, Mr. Rosen, who succeeded Murray in Bernardo’s defence, 
acknowledged that “he had to turn over the tapes, although his research team was
91 Sopinka, supra note 3 at 733.
92 Descoteaux v. Mierzwinski, supra note 7.
93 Sopinka, supra note 3 at 735, “... the communication must be made in order to elicit professional 
advice from the lawyer based upon his or her expertise in the law.”
94 Willston & Rolls, Law o f Civil Procedure v.2 (1970) at 917 cited in Mitchell et al. v. Canadian 
National Railways (1973), 38 D.L.R. (3d) 581. See also Paciocco & Stuesser, supra note 91 ‘The 
privilege does not apply to documents that existed prior to the solicitor-client relationship.”
trying to find authority to allow him to keep them.”95 Don Stuart writes in 
“Annotation: R. v. Murray,”96 that “it had been rightly conceded that the physical 
evidence of the tapes was not protected by solicitor-client privilege which only 
protects communications between solicitor and client.” The tapes constitute physical 
evidence because they were not created to communicate with a solicitor, and, as 
such, cannot be covered by solicitor-client privilege.97
Exceptions to Solicitor-Client Privilege
Communications for Criminal Purpose or Fraud
Criminal purpose or fraud vitiates privilege that normally applies to solicitor-client 
communications:
If a client seeks guidance from a lawyer in order to facilitate the commission of a 
crime or a fraud, the communication will not be privileged, and it is immaterial 
whether the lawyer is an unwitting dupe or a knowing participant.98
The crime/fraud exception has two branches:
(1) Where a solicitor-client communication itself constitutes a crime; and
(2) Where the purpose of the communication is to obtain legal advice to facilitate the 
commission of a crime.99
The distinction between the two branches should be maintained whenever a given 
set of facts is considered.100 Merely alleging that the purpose of a communication 
is fraud or the commission of a crime is insufficient; more is required to negate
95 R. v. Murray, supra note 39 at para 78.
96 (2000), 34 C.R. (5th) 290 at 291.
97 Destruction of solicitor-client privilege did not oblige Murray to turn the tapes over to police to assist 
in their investigation. Rather, as Gravely J. points out at para 120-121, the “turn-over obligation to the 
prosecution arises from the dilemma counsel faces once improperly in possession of incriminating 
physical evidence,” and not from a positive obligation to disclose incriminating evidence. There is no 
duty to assist police in criminal investigations. R. v. P. (M.B.) (1994), 113 D.L.R. (4th) 461 (S.C.C.).
98 Solosky, supra note 8 at 757 (D.L.R.).
99 R. v. Murray [Evidence-Solicitor-Client-PrivilegeJ, supra note 48 at para 47.
100 Ibid.
privilege:101
There must be something to suggest that the advice facilitated the crime or that the 
lawyer otherwise became a dupe or a conspirator.... It is not enough if the lawyer 
merely advised about the legality of the conduct on which the advice was sought.
In that event, the lawyer would have made himself neither a dupe nor a 
conspirator.102
In some cases, the court has required prima facie proof of the criminal 
purpose,103 while in others the test was whether there was “something to give colour 
to the charge”104 meaning that “there are matters which require exploration and 
explanation.”105 The courts of British Columbia have held that besides evidence 
“giving colour to the charge,” it must shed light on whether or not the client 
committed the acts alleged.106
The exception was considered in R. v. Murray [Evidence-Solicitor-Client- 
Privilegef01 when Bernardo intervened to stop disclosure of past communications 
with his ex-lawyer. Following R. v. Graham,108 Quinn J. held that, even if 
Bernardo’s communications with his solicitor had been criminally motivated, 
motivation alone was insufficient to vitiate privilege; there had to exist an act in 
furtherance of this intention, and the court could find no such act.
While the court concluded that communications between Bernardo and Murray 
were not made for criminal purposes, it did not consider whether the 
communications were a crime. The question would need only have been addressed 
if the tapes that Bernardo passed to Murray qualified as “communications.” The 
issue arises in a scenario where, for example, a physician makes videotapes, intended 
for litigation purposes, that depict criminal acts. When one balances the evidentiary
101 Finers (a Firm) v. Miro, [1990] N.LJ.R. 1387 (C.A.); O'Rourke v. Darbishire, [1920] A.C. 581 
(H.L.).
102 Smith v. Jones, supra note 29.
103 Sopinka, supra note 3.
104 K-West Estates Ltd., v. Linemayr et al (1984), 54 B.C.L.R. 60 (S.C.).
105 Ibid at 66.
106 Middlekamp v. Fraser Valley Reasl Estate Board (1992), 71 B.C.L.R. (2d) (C.A.) 273 and Pax 
Management Ltd. v. C.I.B.C., [1987] 5 W.W.R. 252 (B.C.S.C.).
107 Murray [Evidence-Solicitor-Client Privilege], supra note 48.
108 (1985), 20 C.C.C. (3d) 210 (Ont. C.A.).
value of videotape against its criminal content, the weakness of exception-based 
analysis is revealed -  the outcome is difficult to predict in new situations. 
Employing the principled analysis within the framework of Wigmore’s criteria, is 
the best way to ensure reliability.109
The Public Safety Exception
The Supreme Court of Canada recently examined another exception to privilege in 
Smith v. Jones.m  The factors considered in determining whether public safety 
outweighs privilege were summarised as follows:
(1) Is there a clear risk to an identifiable person or group of persons?
It is important the people in danger be identified, otherwise the threat of violence 
may be too obscure to pass muster. However, if the threat of harm appears 
“extremely serious, compelling or imminent,” then even a general threat may satisfy 
the test.
(2) Is there a risk of serious bodily harm or death?
(3) Is the danger imminent?
To qualify for a waiver of privilege, the threat must entail a sense of urgency. The 
necessity of imposing a temporal qualification of the risk depends on the seriousness 
of the threat.
The majority in Smith v. Jones held that if a clear and imminent threat of serious 
bodily harm to an identifiable group exists, and the threat conveys a sense of 
urgency, then privilege must be set aside. Major J., speaking for the dissent, 
supported the test for waiver of privilege, but insisted that “a limited exception 
which does not include conscriptive evidence against the accused would address the 
immediate concern for public safety... while respecting the importance of privilege.” 
In other words, disagreement between members of the court was not related to the
109 See Case Study, p. 210.
110 Smith v. Jones, supra note 29.
test per se but rather to the scope of disclosure.111
The public safety exception does not apply to the Bernardo tapes since they 
record a fait accompli rather than actions representing any future threat. The tapes, 
however, would have met the requirements of the public safety exception, if 
privilege had been raised during the trial to declare Bernardo a dangerous 
offender.112
Waiver o f Privilege
Since privilege stemming from the solicitor-client relationship belongs to the client, 
waiving privilege should be the client’s prerogative. Legal advisers do, however, 
have authority to bind clients to matters arising in or incidental to litigation,113 and 
this authority can extend to waiver of privilege.114 Although Canadian courts 
acknowledge a solicitor’s authority to act for his client, they are reluctant to allow 
solicitors to disclose information for their client. In fact, they have “assumed for 
themselves the role of ensuring that without the client’s express consent the solicitor 
may not testify.”115
Waiver is effected when the client makes a voluntary disclosure, consents to 
disclosure of any material part of a communication,116 or gives evidence of a 
confidential communication.117 Waiver in the interests of fairness can occur when 
a party adopts a position inconsistent with privilege, as in Land v. Kaufinan,118 where 
the statement of claim contained information later claimed to be privileged. Waiver
111 For an analysis of Smith v. Jones, supra note 29 see Wayne N. Renke, “Case Comment: Secrets and 
Lives -  The Public Safety Exception to Solicitor-Client Privilege: Smith v. Jones” (1999) 37:4 Alta. L. 
Rev. 1045.
U2R. v. Bernardo [Dangerous offender application], [ 1995] O.J. No. 3866. Bernardo was found to be 
a dangerous offender who “constituted a threat to life, safety, physical and mental well-being of other 
persons.”
113 Sopinka, supra note 3 at 755.
1,4 Derby & Co. Ltd. v. Weldon (No. 8), [1991] 1 W.L.R. 73 at 87(C.A.); Great Atlantic Insurance Co. 
v. Home Insurance Co., [1981] 1 W.L.R. 529 at 590 (C.A.).
115 Geffen etal. v. Goodman et. al. (1991), 81 D.L.R. (4th) 211 (S.C.C.) at 232.
116 Sopinka, supra note 3 at 756.
117 Smith v. Smith, [1958] O.W.N. 135 (H.C.J.).
1,8 (1991), 2 W.D.C.P. (2d) 259 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
based on fairness was applied in R. v. Campbell119 when the R.C.M.P. brought into 
issue a good faith belief in the legality of a reverse-sting operation based on advice 
received from lawyers at the Department of Justice. The Supreme Court of Canada 
held that the R.C.M.P. had waived its right to solicitor-client privilege with respect 
to the advice they relied on.
When the court applied these principles to the advice Bernardo received, it 
concluded120 that there was no support:
for applying the doctrine o f  waiver or implied waiver to proceedings other than 
where the client, either by his conduct in those proceedings o f  by this pleadings, has 
expressly or impliedly waived the privilege. ... The conduct leading to a finding or 
a  waiver would include the conduct o f  the client either as a party or a witness. The 
conduct o f  Bernardo does not satisfy any o f  these requirements.121
Right to Make Full Answer and Defence
As demonstrated, while solicitor-client is the maximum privilege recognised by the 
courts, it is not absolute. Specifically, it gives way to a party’s right to make full 
answer and defence to criminal accusations. The Supreme Court of Canada 
explained it this way in A. (L.L.) v. B. (A.):m
When the enforcement o f  a  privilege means that the accused will be limited as to his 
or her right to make full answer and defence to criminal accusations, this Court has 
strongly tended to favour disclosure. ... the solicitor-client privilege ... will be 
overridden to allow the accused to make full answer and defence to a criminal 
charge.
The override is not automatic; in R. v. Mills,123 the Supreme Court of Canada 
recommended a contextual balancing process, in which the right to make full answer 
and defence “must be defined in a context that includes other principles of 
fundamental justice and Charter provisions.”
"* [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565.
120 R. v. Murray [Evidence-Solicitor-Client-PrivilegeJ, supra note 48.
121 Ibid at para 73.
122 [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536, sub nom. R. v. Beharriell at para 69.
123 (1999), 139 C.C.C. (3d) 321 at 364.
In balancing these factors, the court in Re Murray and The Queen124 considered 
both Bernardo and Murray’s rights before concluding that the prejudice to Murray 
resulting from solicitor-client privilege would outweigh that experienced by 
Bernardo in the absence of privilege. Gravely J. held that,
Apart from Mr. Bem anrdo’s right in principle to preserve solicitor-client privilege 
... having lost his appeal to the Court o f  Appeal, any prejudice he might suffer by 
way o f invasion o f  his privilege is largely theoretical and is dependent upon his 
obtaining leave to appeal to the Supreme Court o f  Canada and eventually ending up 
with a new trial. I view the chances o f  that happening as remote. On the other side 
o f  the scale, Mr. M urray’s ability to defend him self on this very serious charge is 
threatened and indeed his very liberty is at stake. There is no doubt that Mr. 
Bernardo’s privilege must give way to the overwhelming importance o f  Mr. 
M urray’s right to full answer and defence. To what extent must the override occur?
Mr. Bernardo’s privilege does not disappear but only yields to full answer and 
defence as necessary .... to adequately conduct the defence, I am satisfied that the 
invasion o f  Mr. Bernardo’s solicitor-client privilege must be extensive.125
Principle-Based Analysis o f Exceptions to Solicitor-Client Privilege
Solicitor-client privilege for obtaining legal advice meets Wigmore’s four 
conditions:126
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be 
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory 
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be 
sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the 
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct 
disposal of litigation.
124 (2000), 144 C.C.C. (3d) 322.
115 Ibid at paras 14-16.
126 Manes & Silver, supra note 28 at 21.
If the solicitor is acting in his professional capacity, the first three conditions of 
Wigmore’s test are satisfied for solicitor-client communications. To satisfy the 
fourth requirement, the advantages of protecting a communication from disclosure 
must first be weighed.127 Adverse effects to be considered, include injury to the 
relationship between parties claiming privilege, or injury to other relationships of a 
similar nature.128 Effects of non-disclosure must be examined in light of their impact 
on society129 and the analysis must reflect Charter values.130 Finally, to balance 
competing interests, the court must exercise common sense and good judgement.131
Operation o f the Rules ofSolicitor-Client Privilege
The principles of application were articulated by the Supreme Court in Descoteaux 
v. Mierzwinski132 as follows:
(1) The confidentiality o f communications between solicitor and client may be 
raised in any circumstances where such communications are likely to be disclosed 
without the client’s consent.
(2) Unless the law provides otherwise, when and to the extent that the legitimate 
exercise o f  a  right would interfere with another person’s right to have his 
communications with his lawyer kept confidential, the resulting conflict should be 
resolved in favour o f  protecting the confidentiality.
(3) W hen the law gives someone the authority to do something which, in the 
circumstances o f  the case, might interfere with that confidentiality, the decision to 
do so and the choice o f  means o f  exercising that authority should be determined with 
a view to not interfering with it except to the extent absolutely necessary in order to 
achieve the ends sought by the enabling legislation.
(4) Acts providing otherwise in situations under paragraph 2 and enabling legislation 
referred to in paragraph 3 must be interpreted restrictively.
127 Ryan, supra note 1 at para 29. The privilege in question was between doctor and patient.
m Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid at para 30.
131 Ibid at para 32.
132 Descoteaux v. Mierzwinski, supra note 7 at 875.
Confidentiality is not merely a rule of evidence but a substantive rule as well.133 
It can be raised in any circumstances where the client’s communications are likely 
to be disclosed without his consent. There exists a general presumption in favour 
of confidentiality by which legislation that interferes with this right must be drafted 
in the least intrusive way.134 Privilege has a protracted-temporal aspect; in many 
cases protection has been extended beyond situations when admissibility normally 
arises (i.e. trial and discovery) to cover early investigative stages when a solicitor is 
faced with a search warrant.135 This development was narrowed in Solosky v. 
Canada, to ensure that an evidentiary connection remained and that privilege did not 
become a rule of property. Once privilege attaches to a document, it remains 
attached for the benefit of the client136 so that “once privileged, always 
privileged.”137 However, privilege is definite and once a party asserting privilege no 
longer has an interest to protect, the privilege may cease to exist.138
It is regrettable that, given the complexity of the rules governing solicitor-client 
privilege, professional organisations in Canada have not provided more guidance for 
lawyers by clearly delineating the scope of privilege. Neither the Rules o f  
Professional Conduct published by the Law Society of Upper Canada (L.S.U.C), the 
Code o f Professional Conduct of the Canadian Bar Association nor the professional 
codes of any other province address the scope of solicitor-client privilege. In the 
wake of Murray’s trial, the L.S.U.C. has appointed a special committee139 to create 
a code of professional conduct for lawyers put in circumstances comparable to 
Murray’s.140
133 Descoteaux v. Mierzwinski, supra note 7 at 875.
134Ibid.
135 Sopinka, supra note 3 at 739.
136 Delisle, supra note 10 at 668.
137 Ibid, citing Calcraft v. Guest, [1989] 1 Q.B. 759 at 761 (C.A.).
138 R. v. Dunbar (1982), 68 C.C.C. (2d) 13 at 42 (Ont. C.A.).
139 Scheduled to report back to Convocation on January 25,2001.
140 D. Gambrill, “Murray Free and Clear” (2000) 11: 42 Law Times 1 at 1.
Conclusion
Case Study
Although privilege could not attach to the Bernardo tapes since they are obscene 
materials and not legal communications, our examination of solicitor-client privilege 
is not entirely academic. It is likely that litigation will soon arise concerning the 
status of videotapes allegedly containing evidence of a crime but created for 
obtaining legal advice and thereby constituting legitimate solicitor-client 
communications. The question of whether to characterise the tapes as “physical 
evidence of a crime” or “solicitor-client communications” and which 
characterization should prevail will eventually need to be addressed to fill the gap 
left by the decision in R. v. Murray.
It is common practice among surgeons to videotape operations they perform, 
and introduce the tapes as evidence in medical malpractice suits.141 Videotaping 
sessions with patients may also be sound practice for psychiatrists concerned about 
allegations of misconduct.142 Although psychiatrists may be reluctant to videotape 
sessions because of patient confidentiality issues,143 they can use such videotapes to 
mount a defence either,
(1) because an implied waiver of confidentiality arises when the patient makes his
141 In Mok v. Wong, [ 1996] O.J. No. 1971 a videotape showing the precise cosmetic procedure performed 
by Dr. Wong on Mrs. Mok was viewed by an expert witness to determine if the procedure was 
appropriate.
142 In a recent case, P. V.M. (Re), [1995] O.C.P.S.D. No. 2, Dr. P.V.M., a psychiatrist was accused by a 
former patient of forcing a sexual relationship on her. The patient alleged numerous instances of sexual 
misconduct. One difficulty dealing with incidents alleged to have happened more than twenty years 
previous, was creating an accurate reconstruction of events. Dr. P.V.M. testified from his written 
records. Ultimately, the allegations failed because the court did not find the complainant a credible 
witness.
143 In a recent sexual assault case, R. v. Milk, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, the Supreme Court of Canada 
confirmed that there is no absolute privilege protecting therapy records. The accused would not have 
access to the complainant’s records containing irrelevant information that might distort the search for 
truth. But the rights of the accused must prevail where the lack of disclosure would render him unable 
to make full answer and defence. In Smith v. Jones, supra note 29, a psychiatrist evaluation (prepared 
for litigation) of the accused finding him to be dangerous was held not to be privileged through an 
operation of the public safety exception.
or her medical condition an issue in the case;144
(2) because the accused psychiatrist would not be able to make “full answer and 
defence” without the tapes;145 or
(3) because it is trite law that once a document is relied upon146 as evidence, 
privilege which would otherwise attach is waived.147
If a complainant seeks to introduce records of sessions made by a defendant 
psychiatrist, the psychiatrist may successfully claim privilege for the records. To 
date, there is no reported Canadian case in which the issue has arisen; doctors appear 
eager to release information in their possession to clear themselves of charges.148 
It is conceivable that a doctor might videotape sessions to limit liability and that he 
might be reluctant to disclose those tapes where they hurt his case.
Application of the principled approach to balance competing interests is 
preferable to sifting through a list of execptions.149 Ordering disclosure of the tapes 
would clearly injure the solicitor-client relationship by removing privilege crucial 
to the relationship. However, if the tapes are not disclosed, the Crown is prevented 
from obtaining evidence that may settle the case. While the Charter ensures
144 When an allegation of sexual misconduct is made against a psychiatrist, the patient’s mental health 
becomes an issue in the case because the perceived sexual conduct might be a result of the patient’s 
delusion or the entire story may be fabricated by a depressed patient. See, for example, P. V.M. (Re), 
supra note 142.
145 R. v. Mills, supra note 143.
146 If the patient seeks to introduce the record of a session into evidence, he waives any right of 
confidentiality with respect to the record.
147 Edwards v. Law Society o f Upper Canada, [1995] O.J. No. 2900 at para 13.
148 A doctor was unwilling to volunteer information in G.A.B. v. Sampath, [1999] N.J. No. 164 (Nfld. 
S.C.) where the plaintiff alleged that she was forced to have a sexual relationship with the defendant who 
was her psychiatrist for a substantial part of the relationship. Dr. Sampath maintained that the 
relationship was consensual and opposed the production of his notes made during sessions. When he 
consulted his own psychiatrist, the plaintiff went after those records as well. The court concluded that 
the records of sessions between Sampath and his psychiatrist were privileged and would remain so since 
the records were irrelevant to the allegations at issue. [The court cited Ryan, supra note 1 as the relevant 
authority. The same test was reiterated in R. v. Mills, supra note 143.]
149 Since it is solicitor-client privilege that is claimed for the tapes, Parts 1-3 of Wigmore’s test are 
satisfied.
people’s liberty, the right is not absolute150 and restrictions according to the 
principles of fundamental justice are permitted.151
The answer, in this case, lies in the fact that the injury to the interests of justice 
is relatively small, because in the vast majority of cases there is no videotape 
evidence available to resolve allegations. Despite the limited number of people who 
keep videotape records, the justice system has continued to work unimpeded. 
However, when a person decides to make videotapes to protect his interests, should 
litigation arise, he implicitly relies on the protection of solicitor-client privilege 
assuming that the evidence he creates will remain in his control. Law enforcers 
should not reap where they have not sown. Privilege should rest with the creator of 
videotape evidence.
Summary
Solicitor-client privilege is a long-standing rule of law that protects confidential 
communications between a client and lawyer. Solicitor-client privilege only attaches 
to confidential communications that pass between a client and lawyer when seeking 
legal advice. Solicitor-client privilege does not protect the tapes that Bernardo 
conveyed to Murray because they were not prepared for the dominant purpose of 
seeking legal advice. It is my position, however, that the tapes were 
“communications” for the purposes of privilege, and that privilege should attach in 
situations where videotapes of alleged crimes are created to seek legal advice (such 
as when a surgeon or a psychiatrist videotapes operations or sessions with a patient).
Privilege can be removed if the client waives it, or if maintaining the privilege 
poses a threat to public safety. A more difficult exception in the context of dual­
characterisation videotape evidence is the “criminal purpose or fraud” exception. 
For a videotape that is both a communication for the purposes of mounting a defence 
and evidence of a crime, the determination of whether privilege should attach is best 
made through principled analysis. Application of principled analysis to decide 
whether privilege attaches leads to the conclusion that videotapes made for 
protection from litigation should remain privileged no matter what they depict. 
Since most cases are prosecuted without videotape evidence, preventing disclosure 
of videotapes will not seriously impair the justice system. Conversely, disclosure 
of communications made in full expectation of confidentiality will harm, both the
150 Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms, s. 1.
151 Ibid, s.8.
solicitor-client relationship, and the ability of the accused to mount the best possible 
defence.
R. v. Murray shows how technological advances create new difficulties in time- 
hallowed areas of the law. To prepare for these dilemmas, lawmakers must either 
create an exhaustive list of guidelines that will account for any future situations -  an 
impossible task -  or construct a simple principle that will yield logical and 
predictable results. Questions concerning privilege will continue to surface as the 
use of video recorders becomes more widespread. It may be a good idea to come up 
with some answers.
